Is being something and not any other thing a necessary and sufficient condition of existence?










3















Is being something and not any other thing a necessary and (the only) sufficient condition of existence?



I'm working on something close to the idea of Apoha, but in an ontological sense. I suppose that the answer is yes, since: a) it's necessary, because otherwise one thing would coincide with another, and b) sufficient, because it exhausts all possible relationships; if one thing is not all the others, it can only be itself. I.e. this chair is exactly what it is because it is not a table, a mountain, a mere mental representation, something I can not sit in and so on.



I use 'thing' in a fairly loose way here, to include objects such as buildings, countries, and stars; and events such as the extinction of the dinosaurs, plane journeys, and the death of Hegel.



I use necessary as a condition that must be fulfilled in order to make a states of affairs true. If something is not different from any other thing, it can't be itself. I.e: if this rabbit is not different from that duck, it's not a rabbit, but a duck.



I use sufficient as condition that, if satisfied, guarantees the truth of a states of affairs. If one thing is not any others, it can only be itself, and it need no more requisites for being so. I.e. this rabbit is not that table, the number seven, France, the animal I'm not watching now, an idea, a rabbit outside my room, a ghost etc.



edit:



This definition does not seem to account for becoming. Each object, in fact, is taken into account as an isolated spatio-temporal fraction, as in a sequence of stillshots.



We can say, however, that even "becoming" must be different from anything else in order to be what it is. i.e I can consider the whole "motion of this arrow from my bow to that apple" like any other entity, and to assert that its existence is due to the fact that it's not an apple, it's not a motionless arrow, the number 32, a red nose, France, an itch, the arrow in an instant t1, a ghost, falling in love, 100$ ... every identity has vague limits, from the movement of an arrow to a pile of rocks or a brick – and only differences as stated above seems to fully account for any single identity.






logic metaphysics ontology being







share|improve this question



















  • 1





    I hope my edit phrased your question as you intended. If not, please roll back.

    – Frank Hubeny
    Aug 27 '18 at 10:15






  • 1





    This is the law of identity and according to some it completely fails to account for becoming, i.e. motion and change. We do and we do not enter the same rivers, we are and we are not, as Heraclitus put it. In this sense it is neither necessary nor sufficient for existence.

    – Conifold
    Aug 27 '18 at 21:56











  • @Conifold not really: x in an instant of time t1 is different from x in t2. The definition can account both motion and change

    – Francesco D'Isa
    Aug 28 '18 at 7:15






  • 1





    The difference is between motion and a sequence of stillshots, so such a description misses motion as such, and hence existence as such. But you are right, this is not a place to discuss it.

    – Conifold
    Aug 28 '18 at 8:03







  • 1





    You are not using the standard definition of sufficient if you think sufficient means something exhausts all possible relationships. Sufficient typically expresses that a minimum factor is met. In other words, there are other ways to get the same result. Necessary expresses that it is literally impossible to get another result once you combine the right variables. Your argument seems to vague to put this as a serious effort. The more details you put in the better the argument will be to evaluate.

    – Logikal
    Sep 3 '18 at 17:11















3















Is being something and not any other thing a necessary and (the only) sufficient condition of existence?



I'm working on something close to the idea of Apoha, but in an ontological sense. I suppose that the answer is yes, since: a) it's necessary, because otherwise one thing would coincide with another, and b) sufficient, because it exhausts all possible relationships; if one thing is not all the others, it can only be itself. I.e. this chair is exactly what it is because it is not a table, a mountain, a mere mental representation, something I can not sit in and so on.



I use 'thing' in a fairly loose way here, to include objects such as buildings, countries, and stars; and events such as the extinction of the dinosaurs, plane journeys, and the death of Hegel.



I use necessary as a condition that must be fulfilled in order to make a states of affairs true. If something is not different from any other thing, it can't be itself. I.e: if this rabbit is not different from that duck, it's not a rabbit, but a duck.



I use sufficient as condition that, if satisfied, guarantees the truth of a states of affairs. If one thing is not any others, it can only be itself, and it need no more requisites for being so. I.e. this rabbit is not that table, the number seven, France, the animal I'm not watching now, an idea, a rabbit outside my room, a ghost etc.



edit:



This definition does not seem to account for becoming. Each object, in fact, is taken into account as an isolated spatio-temporal fraction, as in a sequence of stillshots.



We can say, however, that even "becoming" must be different from anything else in order to be what it is. i.e I can consider the whole "motion of this arrow from my bow to that apple" like any other entity, and to assert that its existence is due to the fact that it's not an apple, it's not a motionless arrow, the number 32, a red nose, France, an itch, the arrow in an instant t1, a ghost, falling in love, 100$ ... every identity has vague limits, from the movement of an arrow to a pile of rocks or a brick – and only differences as stated above seems to fully account for any single identity.






logic metaphysics ontology being







share|improve this question



















  • 1





    I hope my edit phrased your question as you intended. If not, please roll back.

    – Frank Hubeny
    Aug 27 '18 at 10:15






  • 1





    This is the law of identity and according to some it completely fails to account for becoming, i.e. motion and change. We do and we do not enter the same rivers, we are and we are not, as Heraclitus put it. In this sense it is neither necessary nor sufficient for existence.

    – Conifold
    Aug 27 '18 at 21:56











  • @Conifold not really: x in an instant of time t1 is different from x in t2. The definition can account both motion and change

    – Francesco D'Isa
    Aug 28 '18 at 7:15






  • 1





    The difference is between motion and a sequence of stillshots, so such a description misses motion as such, and hence existence as such. But you are right, this is not a place to discuss it.

    – Conifold
    Aug 28 '18 at 8:03







  • 1





    You are not using the standard definition of sufficient if you think sufficient means something exhausts all possible relationships. Sufficient typically expresses that a minimum factor is met. In other words, there are other ways to get the same result. Necessary expresses that it is literally impossible to get another result once you combine the right variables. Your argument seems to vague to put this as a serious effort. The more details you put in the better the argument will be to evaluate.

    – Logikal
    Sep 3 '18 at 17:11













3












3








3


1






Is being something and not any other thing a necessary and (the only) sufficient condition of existence?



I'm working on something close to the idea of Apoha, but in an ontological sense. I suppose that the answer is yes, since: a) it's necessary, because otherwise one thing would coincide with another, and b) sufficient, because it exhausts all possible relationships; if one thing is not all the others, it can only be itself. I.e. this chair is exactly what it is because it is not a table, a mountain, a mere mental representation, something I can not sit in and so on.



I use 'thing' in a fairly loose way here, to include objects such as buildings, countries, and stars; and events such as the extinction of the dinosaurs, plane journeys, and the death of Hegel.



I use necessary as a condition that must be fulfilled in order to make a states of affairs true. If something is not different from any other thing, it can't be itself. I.e: if this rabbit is not different from that duck, it's not a rabbit, but a duck.



I use sufficient as condition that, if satisfied, guarantees the truth of a states of affairs. If one thing is not any others, it can only be itself, and it need no more requisites for being so. I.e. this rabbit is not that table, the number seven, France, the animal I'm not watching now, an idea, a rabbit outside my room, a ghost etc.



edit:



This definition does not seem to account for becoming. Each object, in fact, is taken into account as an isolated spatio-temporal fraction, as in a sequence of stillshots.



We can say, however, that even "becoming" must be different from anything else in order to be what it is. i.e I can consider the whole "motion of this arrow from my bow to that apple" like any other entity, and to assert that its existence is due to the fact that it's not an apple, it's not a motionless arrow, the number 32, a red nose, France, an itch, the arrow in an instant t1, a ghost, falling in love, 100$ ... every identity has vague limits, from the movement of an arrow to a pile of rocks or a brick – and only differences as stated above seems to fully account for any single identity.






logic metaphysics ontology being







share|improve this question
















Is being something and not any other thing a necessary and (the only) sufficient condition of existence?



I'm working on something close to the idea of Apoha, but in an ontological sense. I suppose that the answer is yes, since: a) it's necessary, because otherwise one thing would coincide with another, and b) sufficient, because it exhausts all possible relationships; if one thing is not all the others, it can only be itself. I.e. this chair is exactly what it is because it is not a table, a mountain, a mere mental representation, something I can not sit in and so on.



I use 'thing' in a fairly loose way here, to include objects such as buildings, countries, and stars; and events such as the extinction of the dinosaurs, plane journeys, and the death of Hegel.



I use necessary as a condition that must be fulfilled in order to make a states of affairs true. If something is not different from any other thing, it can't be itself. I.e: if this rabbit is not different from that duck, it's not a rabbit, but a duck.



I use sufficient as condition that, if satisfied, guarantees the truth of a states of affairs. If one thing is not any others, it can only be itself, and it need no more requisites for being so. I.e. this rabbit is not that table, the number seven, France, the animal I'm not watching now, an idea, a rabbit outside my room, a ghost etc.



edit:



This definition does not seem to account for becoming. Each object, in fact, is taken into account as an isolated spatio-temporal fraction, as in a sequence of stillshots.



We can say, however, that even "becoming" must be different from anything else in order to be what it is. i.e I can consider the whole "motion of this arrow from my bow to that apple" like any other entity, and to assert that its existence is due to the fact that it's not an apple, it's not a motionless arrow, the number 32, a red nose, France, an itch, the arrow in an instant t1, a ghost, falling in love, 100$ ... every identity has vague limits, from the movement of an arrow to a pile of rocks or a brick – and only differences as stated above seems to fully account for any single identity.






logic metaphysics ontology being




logic metaphysics ontology being






share|improve this question















share|improve this question













share|improve this question




share|improve this question








edited Sep 4 '18 at 16:03







Francesco D'Isa

















asked Aug 27 '18 at 9:21









Francesco D'IsaFrancesco D'Isa

665214




665214







  • 1





    I hope my edit phrased your question as you intended. If not, please roll back.

    – Frank Hubeny
    Aug 27 '18 at 10:15






  • 1





    This is the law of identity and according to some it completely fails to account for becoming, i.e. motion and change. We do and we do not enter the same rivers, we are and we are not, as Heraclitus put it. In this sense it is neither necessary nor sufficient for existence.

    – Conifold
    Aug 27 '18 at 21:56











  • @Conifold not really: x in an instant of time t1 is different from x in t2. The definition can account both motion and change

    – Francesco D'Isa
    Aug 28 '18 at 7:15






  • 1





    The difference is between motion and a sequence of stillshots, so such a description misses motion as such, and hence existence as such. But you are right, this is not a place to discuss it.

    – Conifold
    Aug 28 '18 at 8:03







  • 1





    You are not using the standard definition of sufficient if you think sufficient means something exhausts all possible relationships. Sufficient typically expresses that a minimum factor is met. In other words, there are other ways to get the same result. Necessary expresses that it is literally impossible to get another result once you combine the right variables. Your argument seems to vague to put this as a serious effort. The more details you put in the better the argument will be to evaluate.

    – Logikal
    Sep 3 '18 at 17:11












  • 1





    I hope my edit phrased your question as you intended. If not, please roll back.

    – Frank Hubeny
    Aug 27 '18 at 10:15






  • 1





    This is the law of identity and according to some it completely fails to account for becoming, i.e. motion and change. We do and we do not enter the same rivers, we are and we are not, as Heraclitus put it. In this sense it is neither necessary nor sufficient for existence.

    – Conifold
    Aug 27 '18 at 21:56











  • @Conifold not really: x in an instant of time t1 is different from x in t2. The definition can account both motion and change

    – Francesco D'Isa
    Aug 28 '18 at 7:15






  • 1





    The difference is between motion and a sequence of stillshots, so such a description misses motion as such, and hence existence as such. But you are right, this is not a place to discuss it.

    – Conifold
    Aug 28 '18 at 8:03







  • 1





    You are not using the standard definition of sufficient if you think sufficient means something exhausts all possible relationships. Sufficient typically expresses that a minimum factor is met. In other words, there are other ways to get the same result. Necessary expresses that it is literally impossible to get another result once you combine the right variables. Your argument seems to vague to put this as a serious effort. The more details you put in the better the argument will be to evaluate.

    – Logikal
    Sep 3 '18 at 17:11







1




1





I hope my edit phrased your question as you intended. If not, please roll back.

– Frank Hubeny
Aug 27 '18 at 10:15





I hope my edit phrased your question as you intended. If not, please roll back.

– Frank Hubeny
Aug 27 '18 at 10:15




1




1





This is the law of identity and according to some it completely fails to account for becoming, i.e. motion and change. We do and we do not enter the same rivers, we are and we are not, as Heraclitus put it. In this sense it is neither necessary nor sufficient for existence.

– Conifold
Aug 27 '18 at 21:56





This is the law of identity and according to some it completely fails to account for becoming, i.e. motion and change. We do and we do not enter the same rivers, we are and we are not, as Heraclitus put it. In this sense it is neither necessary nor sufficient for existence.

– Conifold
Aug 27 '18 at 21:56













@Conifold not really: x in an instant of time t1 is different from x in t2. The definition can account both motion and change

– Francesco D'Isa
Aug 28 '18 at 7:15





@Conifold not really: x in an instant of time t1 is different from x in t2. The definition can account both motion and change

– Francesco D'Isa
Aug 28 '18 at 7:15




1




1





The difference is between motion and a sequence of stillshots, so such a description misses motion as such, and hence existence as such. But you are right, this is not a place to discuss it.

– Conifold
Aug 28 '18 at 8:03






The difference is between motion and a sequence of stillshots, so such a description misses motion as such, and hence existence as such. But you are right, this is not a place to discuss it.

– Conifold
Aug 28 '18 at 8:03





1




1





You are not using the standard definition of sufficient if you think sufficient means something exhausts all possible relationships. Sufficient typically expresses that a minimum factor is met. In other words, there are other ways to get the same result. Necessary expresses that it is literally impossible to get another result once you combine the right variables. Your argument seems to vague to put this as a serious effort. The more details you put in the better the argument will be to evaluate.

– Logikal
Sep 3 '18 at 17:11





You are not using the standard definition of sufficient if you think sufficient means something exhausts all possible relationships. Sufficient typically expresses that a minimum factor is met. In other words, there are other ways to get the same result. Necessary expresses that it is literally impossible to get another result once you combine the right variables. Your argument seems to vague to put this as a serious effort. The more details you put in the better the argument will be to evaluate.

– Logikal
Sep 3 '18 at 17:11










4 Answers
4






active

oldest

votes


















3














Is the following an accurate statement of your position ? It does not use the terms, 'necessary and sufficient condition', but it appears to connect easily with the terms of your question.




The Buddhist theory of apoha is a counter-part of the realist theory of universals.
According to this theory words and concepts are dialectical by their very nature. They
proceed on the basis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating
their opposite meaning (*). When a word or concept is uttered, it at once means what
it is not. For instance when the word "cow" is uttered, it at once means that it is not
a "non-cow". The apprehension of a cow depends on the exclusion of all those things
which are non-cows. The cow and the non-cow are mutually exclusive terms. Cows are
completely different among themselves. There are not even two cows which are similar to
one another. But in contrast with lions, elephants and horses, they are similar. It is this
similarity which generates the wrong notion of identity, universality or commonness.
In fact the human mind is incapable of apprehending all the innumerable particulars
in their own individuality. It forsakes their difference and apprehends only their similarity. Suffering as we do from transcendental illusion we do not know the real
nature of things. We impose a uniform and undifferentiated form, which is a mental
construction, upon things which are entirely different from one another. Owing to transcendental illusion we forget this imposition, regard it itself as a real thing and say that
it is eternal, all-pervading etc. This doctrine of "exclusion" or "negation" is known as the
doctrine of bhedagraha, apoha, anya-vyavrtti, and atad-vyavrtti. Kamalaslla, explaining the doctrine of apoha says that ? the one uniform, non-different form that is
imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the
form of the "exclusion" of other things and it, being itself of the nature of exclusion
or negation of other things, is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be
one with that which is excluded by it. It ultimately brings about the apprehension of the
thing excluded from others ?




(Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 455.



The emphasis here is, of course, on knowledge or epistemology. Your angle is ontological. Perhaps this further extract will help :




The apoha (the external illusory object) is in the nature of exclusion of others
for three reasons ? (1) It is commonly applied to both existence and non-existence;
(2) It brings about similarity between the extremely dissimilar; and (3) It is experienced
as such (i.e.) having the nature of exclusion of other.



Vacaspati Misra explains the first reason thus: 'Whatever is common to both existence and non-existence can only be in the nature of the exclusion of others, for example
incorporeality which is found in knowledge (which is existent) and also in the hare's horn
(which is non-existent). The objects of determinate perception like a jar or cloth, are similar
(common to both existence and non-existence). This is the logical reason called svahhava hetu. With regard to the objects of determinate perception, we make assertions like "a cow
exists" and "a cow does not exist", which refers to both its existence as well as non
existence. If the object "cow" were of positive nature like the unique particular which
is always of an affirmative nature, i.e. existent only, it could not be related to non
existence because of contradiction. An object which is existent cannot be non-existent.
Nor can a cow be related to existence because it will be a mere repetition. The word
cow being affirmative means a cow which is existent, and therefore to say that "a cow
exists" is a mere repetition.' (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 463-4.)







share|improve this answer






























    2














    Sorry, I wanted to add this as a comment but I'm new here. You might find this interesting: Empty Subject Terms in Buddhist Logic: Dignāga and his Chinese Commentators






    share|improve this answer






























      2














      How would you describe "being something and not any other thing"? One thing can be many things to many people.



      In the example from Geoffrey Thomas of cow and non-cow, there are many definitions on what that can mean. City dwellers will call anything "cow shaped" a cow, even though the word "cow" means a female bovine that has bred. Male bovine are bulls, and neutered male cattle are called steers.




      http://www.clovermeadowsbeef.com/cow-heifer-steer-bull/




      Personally, I also call them steaks, burgers, and lots of other tasty food, as well as leather. Some people might define me as a cow, which would be someone who stuffs their face with food.



      What do you call this?



      Slotted screw driver

      Some people call them slotted screw drivers, while others call them flat bladed/head screw drivers. I call them small pry bars, box cutters, letter openers, chisels, a small hammer, an awl, hole finder, and even juggling prop, among many others.



      Just because something is supposed to be one thing, it doesn't mean it can't be other things as well.



      The chair you mentioned can be a short table, if you sit on the floor, or a foot stool. It can also be a door jamb, a shelf, foot rest, and has a host of other uses. Add a sheet and a small child's imagination, it can be a mountain or a tent.



      I would think, due to the wide ranging use of items and the inaccurate descriptions that language tries applies to them, that to be "something and not any other thing" is next to impossible. Is there anything that can't be used for something other than it was intended for? Even a mind or talent can be used or wasted.



      I would also think that having a definition is good enough for something to exist. We have definitions for things that we aren't sure physically exist (like unicorns and certain subatomic particles), but they at least exist in the imagination.



      Being human isn't just one thing. Being human means being lots of things.




      A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. - Robert A. Heinlein




      http://wiki.c2.com/?SpecializationIsForInsects



      Edit:

      I should also explicitly mention that the "thing that is defined" can be redefined as time goes on. A cow was once "something else" in that it had to be a heifer (unbred female bovine) before it could be a cow. A steer was a bull, until it is castrated.



      Even a small pry bar was a screw driver, until I use it to open a can of paint, then it turns into a stir stick, then a hammer (to put the lid back on), and finally turns back into a screw driver when it returns to my toolbox. According to someone else's philosophy, I should be using different tools for each step. I actually have a paint can opener, many wooden stir sticks, and a couple of hammers, but why go find them when I have my all-in-one tool? Sure, the real stir stick does a better job, and I might usually use one, but maybe I just need to check if the paint is still good.



      Language is used as a way to describe what we perceive and what we perceive can become knowledge. Philosophy is defined as "the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence", so a case can be made that philosophy is a study of the descriptions of how people perceive knowledge, reality, and existence.



      Two people can witness the same thing, but from different perspectives, and gain different knowledge. For instance, one witness of a stabbing might "learn" to not trust people of a certain skin color, while another might "learn" not to go to that part of town after dark, while yet another might "learn" not to shout profanity at someone who has with a knife. Get these three people in the same room, and they will use language to try to convince the others of how correct their knowledge is.



      If I tell you that the little gooey spots on the bottom of your mouse and attached to your mouse pad is actually dead skin cells and oils from your hand, as it rubs against the surfaces of the table and mouse, isn't that going to change your philosophy on hygiene at your computer desk? I likely just used language to cause you to cringe away from your mouse, maybe grab some Lysol, and possibly even to never eat at your desk again.



      But does usage define the item or the item define usage? A screw driver was made for a specific use, hence the name and definition, but I'm redefining by my usage. It didn't go through any metamorphosis while I was using, it was still the same thing I pulled out of my toolbox.






      share|improve this answer

























      • Thank you for your help! A good point, but in my definition based on differences, a "chair used to sit down" and a "chair used like a small table" are two different things, since they are in a different net of relations/differences (with their user, in this case)

        – Francesco D'Isa
        Aug 27 '18 at 19:20











      • @FrancescoD'Isa, so does a "chair used as a small table" change physically when used as a "chair used to sit down" or a "chair used to stand on"? How does the use make something 2-3 different things? The definition may change, but not the item itself.

        – computercarguy
        Aug 27 '18 at 19:31











      • @computercarguy it doesn't, but following the definition of being that I've suggested (and also for other reasons) physical identity is just a partial concept.

        – Francesco D'Isa
        Aug 28 '18 at 7:18











      • I'm not quite sure how relevant it might be to the original topic, but you might want to title that image, "Ceci n'est pas un tournevis", a la Magritte's better-known en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images And if Magritte's idea is relevant here, it might add a whole new dimension to your discussion.

        – John Forkosh
        Aug 28 '18 at 13:43












      • @JohnForkosh, while that's a good suggestion, I feel that goes a little farther than necessary. Sure, the picture of a screw driver isn't a screw driver itself, but if I continued to follow trails like this, I'd never finish adding to the answer. :-)

        – computercarguy
        Aug 28 '18 at 14:28


















      -1














      It necessary but not sufficient for things that are determinate and particular; and not for that which is indeterminate.






      share|improve this answer























      • sounds a little too apodictic, could you please elaborate it?

        – Francesco D'Isa
        Sep 4 '18 at 17:05











      Your Answer








      StackExchange.ready(function()
      var channelOptions =
      tags: "".split(" "),
      id: "265"
      ;
      initTagRenderer("".split(" "), "".split(" "), channelOptions);

      StackExchange.using("externalEditor", function()
      // Have to fire editor after snippets, if snippets enabled
      if (StackExchange.settings.snippets.snippetsEnabled)
      StackExchange.using("snippets", function()
      createEditor();
      );

      else
      createEditor();

      );

      function createEditor()
      StackExchange.prepareEditor(
      heartbeatType: 'answer',
      autoActivateHeartbeat: false,
      convertImagesToLinks: false,
      noModals: true,
      showLowRepImageUploadWarning: true,
      reputationToPostImages: null,
      bindNavPrevention: true,
      postfix: "",
      imageUploader:
      brandingHtml: "Powered by u003ca class="icon-imgur-white" href="https://imgur.com/"u003eu003c/au003e",
      contentPolicyHtml: "User contributions licensed under u003ca href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/"u003ecc by-sa 3.0 with attribution requiredu003c/au003e u003ca href="https://stackoverflow.com/legal/content-policy"u003e(content policy)u003c/au003e",
      allowUrls: true
      ,
      noCode: true, onDemand: true,
      discardSelector: ".discard-answer"
      ,immediatelyShowMarkdownHelp:true
      );



      );













      draft saved

      draft discarded


















      StackExchange.ready(
      function ()
      StackExchange.openid.initPostLogin('.new-post-login', 'https%3a%2f%2fphilosophy.stackexchange.com%2fquestions%2f54955%2fis-being-something-and-not-any-other-thing-a-necessary-and-sufficient-condition%23new-answer', 'question_page');

      );

      Post as a guest















      Required, but never shown

























      4 Answers
      4






      active

      oldest

      votes








      4 Answers
      4






      active

      oldest

      votes









      active

      oldest

      votes






      active

      oldest

      votes









      3














      Is the following an accurate statement of your position ? It does not use the terms, 'necessary and sufficient condition', but it appears to connect easily with the terms of your question.




      The Buddhist theory of apoha is a counter-part of the realist theory of universals.
      According to this theory words and concepts are dialectical by their very nature. They
      proceed on the basis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating
      their opposite meaning (*). When a word or concept is uttered, it at once means what
      it is not. For instance when the word "cow" is uttered, it at once means that it is not
      a "non-cow". The apprehension of a cow depends on the exclusion of all those things
      which are non-cows. The cow and the non-cow are mutually exclusive terms. Cows are
      completely different among themselves. There are not even two cows which are similar to
      one another. But in contrast with lions, elephants and horses, they are similar. It is this
      similarity which generates the wrong notion of identity, universality or commonness.
      In fact the human mind is incapable of apprehending all the innumerable particulars
      in their own individuality. It forsakes their difference and apprehends only their similarity. Suffering as we do from transcendental illusion we do not know the real
      nature of things. We impose a uniform and undifferentiated form, which is a mental
      construction, upon things which are entirely different from one another. Owing to transcendental illusion we forget this imposition, regard it itself as a real thing and say that
      it is eternal, all-pervading etc. This doctrine of "exclusion" or "negation" is known as the
      doctrine of bhedagraha, apoha, anya-vyavrtti, and atad-vyavrtti. Kamalaslla, explaining the doctrine of apoha says that ? the one uniform, non-different form that is
      imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the
      form of the "exclusion" of other things and it, being itself of the nature of exclusion
      or negation of other things, is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be
      one with that which is excluded by it. It ultimately brings about the apprehension of the
      thing excluded from others ?




      (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 455.



      The emphasis here is, of course, on knowledge or epistemology. Your angle is ontological. Perhaps this further extract will help :




      The apoha (the external illusory object) is in the nature of exclusion of others
      for three reasons ? (1) It is commonly applied to both existence and non-existence;
      (2) It brings about similarity between the extremely dissimilar; and (3) It is experienced
      as such (i.e.) having the nature of exclusion of other.



      Vacaspati Misra explains the first reason thus: 'Whatever is common to both existence and non-existence can only be in the nature of the exclusion of others, for example
      incorporeality which is found in knowledge (which is existent) and also in the hare's horn
      (which is non-existent). The objects of determinate perception like a jar or cloth, are similar
      (common to both existence and non-existence). This is the logical reason called svahhava hetu. With regard to the objects of determinate perception, we make assertions like "a cow
      exists" and "a cow does not exist", which refers to both its existence as well as non
      existence      . If the object "cow" were of positive nature like the unique particular which
      is always of an affirmative nature, i.e. existent only, it could not be related to non
      existence       because of contradiction. An object which is existent cannot be non-existent.
      Nor can a cow be related to existence because it will be a mere repetition. The word
      cow being affirmative means a cow which is existent, and therefore to say that "a cow
      exists" is a mere repetition.' (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 463-4.)







      share|improve this answer



























        3














        Is the following an accurate statement of your position ? It does not use the terms, 'necessary and sufficient condition', but it appears to connect easily with the terms of your question.




        The Buddhist theory of apoha is a counter-part of the realist theory of universals.
        According to this theory words and concepts are dialectical by their very nature. They
        proceed on the basis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating
        their opposite meaning (*). When a word or concept is uttered, it at once means what
        it is not. For instance when the word "cow" is uttered, it at once means that it is not
        a "non-cow". The apprehension of a cow depends on the exclusion of all those things
        which are non-cows. The cow and the non-cow are mutually exclusive terms. Cows are
        completely different among themselves. There are not even two cows which are similar to
        one another. But in contrast with lions, elephants and horses, they are similar. It is this
        similarity which generates the wrong notion of identity, universality or commonness.
        In fact the human mind is incapable of apprehending all the innumerable particulars
        in their own individuality. It forsakes their difference and apprehends only their similarity. Suffering as we do from transcendental illusion we do not know the real
        nature of things. We impose a uniform and undifferentiated form, which is a mental
        construction, upon things which are entirely different from one another. Owing to transcendental illusion we forget this imposition, regard it itself as a real thing and say that
        it is eternal, all-pervading etc. This doctrine of "exclusion" or "negation" is known as the
        doctrine of bhedagraha, apoha, anya-vyavrtti, and atad-vyavrtti. Kamalaslla, explaining the doctrine of apoha says that ? the one uniform, non-different form that is
        imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the
        form of the "exclusion" of other things and it, being itself of the nature of exclusion
        or negation of other things, is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be
        one with that which is excluded by it. It ultimately brings about the apprehension of the
        thing excluded from others ?




        (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 455.



        The emphasis here is, of course, on knowledge or epistemology. Your angle is ontological. Perhaps this further extract will help :




        The apoha (the external illusory object) is in the nature of exclusion of others
        for three reasons ? (1) It is commonly applied to both existence and non-existence;
        (2) It brings about similarity between the extremely dissimilar; and (3) It is experienced
        as such (i.e.) having the nature of exclusion of other.



        Vacaspati Misra explains the first reason thus: 'Whatever is common to both existence and non-existence can only be in the nature of the exclusion of others, for example
        incorporeality which is found in knowledge (which is existent) and also in the hare's horn
        (which is non-existent). The objects of determinate perception like a jar or cloth, are similar
        (common to both existence and non-existence). This is the logical reason called svahhava hetu. With regard to the objects of determinate perception, we make assertions like "a cow
        exists" and "a cow does not exist", which refers to both its existence as well as non
        existence        . If the object "cow" were of positive nature like the unique particular which
        is always of an affirmative nature, i.e. existent only, it could not be related to non
        existence         because of contradiction. An object which is existent cannot be non-existent.
        Nor can a cow be related to existence because it will be a mere repetition. The word
        cow being affirmative means a cow which is existent, and therefore to say that "a cow
        exists" is a mere repetition.' (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 463-4.)







        share|improve this answer

























          3












          3








          3







          Is the following an accurate statement of your position ? It does not use the terms, 'necessary and sufficient condition', but it appears to connect easily with the terms of your question.




          The Buddhist theory of apoha is a counter-part of the realist theory of universals.
          According to this theory words and concepts are dialectical by their very nature. They
          proceed on the basis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating
          their opposite meaning (*). When a word or concept is uttered, it at once means what
          it is not. For instance when the word "cow" is uttered, it at once means that it is not
          a "non-cow". The apprehension of a cow depends on the exclusion of all those things
          which are non-cows. The cow and the non-cow are mutually exclusive terms. Cows are
          completely different among themselves. There are not even two cows which are similar to
          one another. But in contrast with lions, elephants and horses, they are similar. It is this
          similarity which generates the wrong notion of identity, universality or commonness.
          In fact the human mind is incapable of apprehending all the innumerable particulars
          in their own individuality. It forsakes their difference and apprehends only their similarity. Suffering as we do from transcendental illusion we do not know the real
          nature of things. We impose a uniform and undifferentiated form, which is a mental
          construction, upon things which are entirely different from one another. Owing to transcendental illusion we forget this imposition, regard it itself as a real thing and say that
          it is eternal, all-pervading etc. This doctrine of "exclusion" or "negation" is known as the
          doctrine of bhedagraha, apoha, anya-vyavrtti, and atad-vyavrtti. Kamalaslla, explaining the doctrine of apoha says that ? the one uniform, non-different form that is
          imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the
          form of the "exclusion" of other things and it, being itself of the nature of exclusion
          or negation of other things, is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be
          one with that which is excluded by it. It ultimately brings about the apprehension of the
          thing excluded from others ?




          (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 455.



          The emphasis here is, of course, on knowledge or epistemology. Your angle is ontological. Perhaps this further extract will help :




          The apoha (the external illusory object) is in the nature of exclusion of others
          for three reasons ? (1) It is commonly applied to both existence and non-existence;
          (2) It brings about similarity between the extremely dissimilar; and (3) It is experienced
          as such (i.e.) having the nature of exclusion of other.



          Vacaspati Misra explains the first reason thus: 'Whatever is common to both existence and non-existence can only be in the nature of the exclusion of others, for example
          incorporeality which is found in knowledge (which is existent) and also in the hare's horn
          (which is non-existent). The objects of determinate perception like a jar or cloth, are similar
          (common to both existence and non-existence). This is the logical reason called svahhava hetu. With regard to the objects of determinate perception, we make assertions like "a cow
          exists" and "a cow does not exist", which refers to both its existence as well as non
          existence          . If the object "cow" were of positive nature like the unique particular which
          is always of an affirmative nature, i.e. existent only, it could not be related to non
          existence           because of contradiction. An object which is existent cannot be non-existent.
          Nor can a cow be related to existence because it will be a mere repetition. The word
          cow being affirmative means a cow which is existent, and therefore to say that "a cow
          exists" is a mere repetition.' (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 463-4.)







          share|improve this answer













          Is the following an accurate statement of your position ? It does not use the terms, 'necessary and sufficient condition', but it appears to connect easily with the terms of your question.




          The Buddhist theory of apoha is a counter-part of the realist theory of universals.
          According to this theory words and concepts are dialectical by their very nature. They
          proceed on the basis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating
          their opposite meaning (*). When a word or concept is uttered, it at once means what
          it is not. For instance when the word "cow" is uttered, it at once means that it is not
          a "non-cow". The apprehension of a cow depends on the exclusion of all those things
          which are non-cows. The cow and the non-cow are mutually exclusive terms. Cows are
          completely different among themselves. There are not even two cows which are similar to
          one another. But in contrast with lions, elephants and horses, they are similar. It is this
          similarity which generates the wrong notion of identity, universality or commonness.
          In fact the human mind is incapable of apprehending all the innumerable particulars
          in their own individuality. It forsakes their difference and apprehends only their similarity. Suffering as we do from transcendental illusion we do not know the real
          nature of things. We impose a uniform and undifferentiated form, which is a mental
          construction, upon things which are entirely different from one another. Owing to transcendental illusion we forget this imposition, regard it itself as a real thing and say that
          it is eternal, all-pervading etc. This doctrine of "exclusion" or "negation" is known as the
          doctrine of bhedagraha, apoha, anya-vyavrtti, and atad-vyavrtti. Kamalaslla, explaining the doctrine of apoha says that ? the one uniform, non-different form that is
          imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the
          form of the "exclusion" of other things and it, being itself of the nature of exclusion
          or negation of other things, is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be
          one with that which is excluded by it. It ultimately brings about the apprehension of the
          thing excluded from others ?




          (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 455.



          The emphasis here is, of course, on knowledge or epistemology. Your angle is ontological. Perhaps this further extract will help :




          The apoha (the external illusory object) is in the nature of exclusion of others
          for three reasons ? (1) It is commonly applied to both existence and non-existence;
          (2) It brings about similarity between the extremely dissimilar; and (3) It is experienced
          as such (i.e.) having the nature of exclusion of other.



          Vacaspati Misra explains the first reason thus: 'Whatever is common to both existence and non-existence can only be in the nature of the exclusion of others, for example
          incorporeality which is found in knowledge (which is existent) and also in the hare's horn
          (which is non-existent). The objects of determinate perception like a jar or cloth, are similar
          (common to both existence and non-existence). This is the logical reason called svahhava hetu. With regard to the objects of determinate perception, we make assertions like "a cow
          exists" and "a cow does not exist", which refers to both its existence as well as non
          existence          . If the object "cow" were of positive nature like the unique particular which
          is always of an affirmative nature, i.e. existent only, it could not be related to non
          existence           because of contradiction. An object which is existent cannot be non-existent.
          Nor can a cow be related to existence because it will be a mere repetition. The word
          cow being affirmative means a cow which is existent, and therefore to say that "a cow
          exists" is a mere repetition.' (Chhote Lal Tripathi, 'The Role of Apoha in Dignāga's Theory of Knowledge', East and West, Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (September-December 1975), pp. 455-470 : 463-4.)








          share|improve this answer












          share|improve this answer



          share|improve this answer










          answered Aug 27 '18 at 11:02









          Geoffrey Thomas♦Geoffrey Thomas

          26.1k221102




          26.1k221102





















              2














              Sorry, I wanted to add this as a comment but I'm new here. You might find this interesting: Empty Subject Terms in Buddhist Logic: Dignāga and his Chinese Commentators






              share|improve this answer



























                2














                Sorry, I wanted to add this as a comment but I'm new here. You might find this interesting: Empty Subject Terms in Buddhist Logic: Dignāga and his Chinese Commentators






                share|improve this answer

























                  2












                  2








                  2







                  Sorry, I wanted to add this as a comment but I'm new here. You might find this interesting: Empty Subject Terms in Buddhist Logic: Dignāga and his Chinese Commentators






                  share|improve this answer













                  Sorry, I wanted to add this as a comment but I'm new here. You might find this interesting: Empty Subject Terms in Buddhist Logic: Dignāga and his Chinese Commentators







                  share|improve this answer












                  share|improve this answer



                  share|improve this answer










                  answered Aug 27 '18 at 10:32









                  CodosaurCodosaur

                  1873




                  1873





















                      2














                      How would you describe "being something and not any other thing"? One thing can be many things to many people.



                      In the example from Geoffrey Thomas of cow and non-cow, there are many definitions on what that can mean. City dwellers will call anything "cow shaped" a cow, even though the word "cow" means a female bovine that has bred. Male bovine are bulls, and neutered male cattle are called steers.




                      http://www.clovermeadowsbeef.com/cow-heifer-steer-bull/




                      Personally, I also call them steaks, burgers, and lots of other tasty food, as well as leather. Some people might define me as a cow, which would be someone who stuffs their face with food.



                      What do you call this?



                      Slotted screw driver

                      Some people call them slotted screw drivers, while others call them flat bladed/head screw drivers. I call them small pry bars, box cutters, letter openers, chisels, a small hammer, an awl, hole finder, and even juggling prop, among many others.



                      Just because something is supposed to be one thing, it doesn't mean it can't be other things as well.



                      The chair you mentioned can be a short table, if you sit on the floor, or a foot stool. It can also be a door jamb, a shelf, foot rest, and has a host of other uses. Add a sheet and a small child's imagination, it can be a mountain or a tent.



                      I would think, due to the wide ranging use of items and the inaccurate descriptions that language tries applies to them, that to be "something and not any other thing" is next to impossible. Is there anything that can't be used for something other than it was intended for? Even a mind or talent can be used or wasted.



                      I would also think that having a definition is good enough for something to exist. We have definitions for things that we aren't sure physically exist (like unicorns and certain subatomic particles), but they at least exist in the imagination.



                      Being human isn't just one thing. Being human means being lots of things.




                      A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. - Robert A. Heinlein




                      http://wiki.c2.com/?SpecializationIsForInsects



                      Edit:

                      I should also explicitly mention that the "thing that is defined" can be redefined as time goes on. A cow was once "something else" in that it had to be a heifer (unbred female bovine) before it could be a cow. A steer was a bull, until it is castrated.



                      Even a small pry bar was a screw driver, until I use it to open a can of paint, then it turns into a stir stick, then a hammer (to put the lid back on), and finally turns back into a screw driver when it returns to my toolbox. According to someone else's philosophy, I should be using different tools for each step. I actually have a paint can opener, many wooden stir sticks, and a couple of hammers, but why go find them when I have my all-in-one tool? Sure, the real stir stick does a better job, and I might usually use one, but maybe I just need to check if the paint is still good.



                      Language is used as a way to describe what we perceive and what we perceive can become knowledge. Philosophy is defined as "the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence", so a case can be made that philosophy is a study of the descriptions of how people perceive knowledge, reality, and existence.



                      Two people can witness the same thing, but from different perspectives, and gain different knowledge. For instance, one witness of a stabbing might "learn" to not trust people of a certain skin color, while another might "learn" not to go to that part of town after dark, while yet another might "learn" not to shout profanity at someone who has with a knife. Get these three people in the same room, and they will use language to try to convince the others of how correct their knowledge is.



                      If I tell you that the little gooey spots on the bottom of your mouse and attached to your mouse pad is actually dead skin cells and oils from your hand, as it rubs against the surfaces of the table and mouse, isn't that going to change your philosophy on hygiene at your computer desk? I likely just used language to cause you to cringe away from your mouse, maybe grab some Lysol, and possibly even to never eat at your desk again.



                      But does usage define the item or the item define usage? A screw driver was made for a specific use, hence the name and definition, but I'm redefining by my usage. It didn't go through any metamorphosis while I was using, it was still the same thing I pulled out of my toolbox.






                      share|improve this answer

























                      • Thank you for your help! A good point, but in my definition based on differences, a "chair used to sit down" and a "chair used like a small table" are two different things, since they are in a different net of relations/differences (with their user, in this case)

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Aug 27 '18 at 19:20











                      • @FrancescoD'Isa, so does a "chair used as a small table" change physically when used as a "chair used to sit down" or a "chair used to stand on"? How does the use make something 2-3 different things? The definition may change, but not the item itself.

                        – computercarguy
                        Aug 27 '18 at 19:31











                      • @computercarguy it doesn't, but following the definition of being that I've suggested (and also for other reasons) physical identity is just a partial concept.

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Aug 28 '18 at 7:18











                      • I'm not quite sure how relevant it might be to the original topic, but you might want to title that image, "Ceci n'est pas un tournevis", a la Magritte's better-known en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images And if Magritte's idea is relevant here, it might add a whole new dimension to your discussion.

                        – John Forkosh
                        Aug 28 '18 at 13:43












                      • @JohnForkosh, while that's a good suggestion, I feel that goes a little farther than necessary. Sure, the picture of a screw driver isn't a screw driver itself, but if I continued to follow trails like this, I'd never finish adding to the answer. :-)

                        – computercarguy
                        Aug 28 '18 at 14:28















                      2














                      How would you describe "being something and not any other thing"? One thing can be many things to many people.



                      In the example from Geoffrey Thomas of cow and non-cow, there are many definitions on what that can mean. City dwellers will call anything "cow shaped" a cow, even though the word "cow" means a female bovine that has bred. Male bovine are bulls, and neutered male cattle are called steers.




                      http://www.clovermeadowsbeef.com/cow-heifer-steer-bull/




                      Personally, I also call them steaks, burgers, and lots of other tasty food, as well as leather. Some people might define me as a cow, which would be someone who stuffs their face with food.



                      What do you call this?



                      Slotted screw driver

                      Some people call them slotted screw drivers, while others call them flat bladed/head screw drivers. I call them small pry bars, box cutters, letter openers, chisels, a small hammer, an awl, hole finder, and even juggling prop, among many others.



                      Just because something is supposed to be one thing, it doesn't mean it can't be other things as well.



                      The chair you mentioned can be a short table, if you sit on the floor, or a foot stool. It can also be a door jamb, a shelf, foot rest, and has a host of other uses. Add a sheet and a small child's imagination, it can be a mountain or a tent.



                      I would think, due to the wide ranging use of items and the inaccurate descriptions that language tries applies to them, that to be "something and not any other thing" is next to impossible. Is there anything that can't be used for something other than it was intended for? Even a mind or talent can be used or wasted.



                      I would also think that having a definition is good enough for something to exist. We have definitions for things that we aren't sure physically exist (like unicorns and certain subatomic particles), but they at least exist in the imagination.



                      Being human isn't just one thing. Being human means being lots of things.




                      A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. - Robert A. Heinlein




                      http://wiki.c2.com/?SpecializationIsForInsects



                      Edit:

                      I should also explicitly mention that the "thing that is defined" can be redefined as time goes on. A cow was once "something else" in that it had to be a heifer (unbred female bovine) before it could be a cow. A steer was a bull, until it is castrated.



                      Even a small pry bar was a screw driver, until I use it to open a can of paint, then it turns into a stir stick, then a hammer (to put the lid back on), and finally turns back into a screw driver when it returns to my toolbox. According to someone else's philosophy, I should be using different tools for each step. I actually have a paint can opener, many wooden stir sticks, and a couple of hammers, but why go find them when I have my all-in-one tool? Sure, the real stir stick does a better job, and I might usually use one, but maybe I just need to check if the paint is still good.



                      Language is used as a way to describe what we perceive and what we perceive can become knowledge. Philosophy is defined as "the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence", so a case can be made that philosophy is a study of the descriptions of how people perceive knowledge, reality, and existence.



                      Two people can witness the same thing, but from different perspectives, and gain different knowledge. For instance, one witness of a stabbing might "learn" to not trust people of a certain skin color, while another might "learn" not to go to that part of town after dark, while yet another might "learn" not to shout profanity at someone who has with a knife. Get these three people in the same room, and they will use language to try to convince the others of how correct their knowledge is.



                      If I tell you that the little gooey spots on the bottom of your mouse and attached to your mouse pad is actually dead skin cells and oils from your hand, as it rubs against the surfaces of the table and mouse, isn't that going to change your philosophy on hygiene at your computer desk? I likely just used language to cause you to cringe away from your mouse, maybe grab some Lysol, and possibly even to never eat at your desk again.



                      But does usage define the item or the item define usage? A screw driver was made for a specific use, hence the name and definition, but I'm redefining by my usage. It didn't go through any metamorphosis while I was using, it was still the same thing I pulled out of my toolbox.






                      share|improve this answer

























                      • Thank you for your help! A good point, but in my definition based on differences, a "chair used to sit down" and a "chair used like a small table" are two different things, since they are in a different net of relations/differences (with their user, in this case)

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Aug 27 '18 at 19:20











                      • @FrancescoD'Isa, so does a "chair used as a small table" change physically when used as a "chair used to sit down" or a "chair used to stand on"? How does the use make something 2-3 different things? The definition may change, but not the item itself.

                        – computercarguy
                        Aug 27 '18 at 19:31











                      • @computercarguy it doesn't, but following the definition of being that I've suggested (and also for other reasons) physical identity is just a partial concept.

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Aug 28 '18 at 7:18











                      • I'm not quite sure how relevant it might be to the original topic, but you might want to title that image, "Ceci n'est pas un tournevis", a la Magritte's better-known en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images And if Magritte's idea is relevant here, it might add a whole new dimension to your discussion.

                        – John Forkosh
                        Aug 28 '18 at 13:43












                      • @JohnForkosh, while that's a good suggestion, I feel that goes a little farther than necessary. Sure, the picture of a screw driver isn't a screw driver itself, but if I continued to follow trails like this, I'd never finish adding to the answer. :-)

                        – computercarguy
                        Aug 28 '18 at 14:28













                      2












                      2








                      2







                      How would you describe "being something and not any other thing"? One thing can be many things to many people.



                      In the example from Geoffrey Thomas of cow and non-cow, there are many definitions on what that can mean. City dwellers will call anything "cow shaped" a cow, even though the word "cow" means a female bovine that has bred. Male bovine are bulls, and neutered male cattle are called steers.




                      http://www.clovermeadowsbeef.com/cow-heifer-steer-bull/




                      Personally, I also call them steaks, burgers, and lots of other tasty food, as well as leather. Some people might define me as a cow, which would be someone who stuffs their face with food.



                      What do you call this?



                      Slotted screw driver

                      Some people call them slotted screw drivers, while others call them flat bladed/head screw drivers. I call them small pry bars, box cutters, letter openers, chisels, a small hammer, an awl, hole finder, and even juggling prop, among many others.



                      Just because something is supposed to be one thing, it doesn't mean it can't be other things as well.



                      The chair you mentioned can be a short table, if you sit on the floor, or a foot stool. It can also be a door jamb, a shelf, foot rest, and has a host of other uses. Add a sheet and a small child's imagination, it can be a mountain or a tent.



                      I would think, due to the wide ranging use of items and the inaccurate descriptions that language tries applies to them, that to be "something and not any other thing" is next to impossible. Is there anything that can't be used for something other than it was intended for? Even a mind or talent can be used or wasted.



                      I would also think that having a definition is good enough for something to exist. We have definitions for things that we aren't sure physically exist (like unicorns and certain subatomic particles), but they at least exist in the imagination.



                      Being human isn't just one thing. Being human means being lots of things.




                      A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. - Robert A. Heinlein




                      http://wiki.c2.com/?SpecializationIsForInsects



                      Edit:

                      I should also explicitly mention that the "thing that is defined" can be redefined as time goes on. A cow was once "something else" in that it had to be a heifer (unbred female bovine) before it could be a cow. A steer was a bull, until it is castrated.



                      Even a small pry bar was a screw driver, until I use it to open a can of paint, then it turns into a stir stick, then a hammer (to put the lid back on), and finally turns back into a screw driver when it returns to my toolbox. According to someone else's philosophy, I should be using different tools for each step. I actually have a paint can opener, many wooden stir sticks, and a couple of hammers, but why go find them when I have my all-in-one tool? Sure, the real stir stick does a better job, and I might usually use one, but maybe I just need to check if the paint is still good.



                      Language is used as a way to describe what we perceive and what we perceive can become knowledge. Philosophy is defined as "the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence", so a case can be made that philosophy is a study of the descriptions of how people perceive knowledge, reality, and existence.



                      Two people can witness the same thing, but from different perspectives, and gain different knowledge. For instance, one witness of a stabbing might "learn" to not trust people of a certain skin color, while another might "learn" not to go to that part of town after dark, while yet another might "learn" not to shout profanity at someone who has with a knife. Get these three people in the same room, and they will use language to try to convince the others of how correct their knowledge is.



                      If I tell you that the little gooey spots on the bottom of your mouse and attached to your mouse pad is actually dead skin cells and oils from your hand, as it rubs against the surfaces of the table and mouse, isn't that going to change your philosophy on hygiene at your computer desk? I likely just used language to cause you to cringe away from your mouse, maybe grab some Lysol, and possibly even to never eat at your desk again.



                      But does usage define the item or the item define usage? A screw driver was made for a specific use, hence the name and definition, but I'm redefining by my usage. It didn't go through any metamorphosis while I was using, it was still the same thing I pulled out of my toolbox.






                      share|improve this answer















                      How would you describe "being something and not any other thing"? One thing can be many things to many people.



                      In the example from Geoffrey Thomas of cow and non-cow, there are many definitions on what that can mean. City dwellers will call anything "cow shaped" a cow, even though the word "cow" means a female bovine that has bred. Male bovine are bulls, and neutered male cattle are called steers.




                      http://www.clovermeadowsbeef.com/cow-heifer-steer-bull/




                      Personally, I also call them steaks, burgers, and lots of other tasty food, as well as leather. Some people might define me as a cow, which would be someone who stuffs their face with food.



                      What do you call this?



                      Slotted screw driver

                      Some people call them slotted screw drivers, while others call them flat bladed/head screw drivers. I call them small pry bars, box cutters, letter openers, chisels, a small hammer, an awl, hole finder, and even juggling prop, among many others.



                      Just because something is supposed to be one thing, it doesn't mean it can't be other things as well.



                      The chair you mentioned can be a short table, if you sit on the floor, or a foot stool. It can also be a door jamb, a shelf, foot rest, and has a host of other uses. Add a sheet and a small child's imagination, it can be a mountain or a tent.



                      I would think, due to the wide ranging use of items and the inaccurate descriptions that language tries applies to them, that to be "something and not any other thing" is next to impossible. Is there anything that can't be used for something other than it was intended for? Even a mind or talent can be used or wasted.



                      I would also think that having a definition is good enough for something to exist. We have definitions for things that we aren't sure physically exist (like unicorns and certain subatomic particles), but they at least exist in the imagination.



                      Being human isn't just one thing. Being human means being lots of things.




                      A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects. - Robert A. Heinlein




                      http://wiki.c2.com/?SpecializationIsForInsects



                      Edit:

                      I should also explicitly mention that the "thing that is defined" can be redefined as time goes on. A cow was once "something else" in that it had to be a heifer (unbred female bovine) before it could be a cow. A steer was a bull, until it is castrated.



                      Even a small pry bar was a screw driver, until I use it to open a can of paint, then it turns into a stir stick, then a hammer (to put the lid back on), and finally turns back into a screw driver when it returns to my toolbox. According to someone else's philosophy, I should be using different tools for each step. I actually have a paint can opener, many wooden stir sticks, and a couple of hammers, but why go find them when I have my all-in-one tool? Sure, the real stir stick does a better job, and I might usually use one, but maybe I just need to check if the paint is still good.



                      Language is used as a way to describe what we perceive and what we perceive can become knowledge. Philosophy is defined as "the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence", so a case can be made that philosophy is a study of the descriptions of how people perceive knowledge, reality, and existence.



                      Two people can witness the same thing, but from different perspectives, and gain different knowledge. For instance, one witness of a stabbing might "learn" to not trust people of a certain skin color, while another might "learn" not to go to that part of town after dark, while yet another might "learn" not to shout profanity at someone who has with a knife. Get these three people in the same room, and they will use language to try to convince the others of how correct their knowledge is.



                      If I tell you that the little gooey spots on the bottom of your mouse and attached to your mouse pad is actually dead skin cells and oils from your hand, as it rubs against the surfaces of the table and mouse, isn't that going to change your philosophy on hygiene at your computer desk? I likely just used language to cause you to cringe away from your mouse, maybe grab some Lysol, and possibly even to never eat at your desk again.



                      But does usage define the item or the item define usage? A screw driver was made for a specific use, hence the name and definition, but I'm redefining by my usage. It didn't go through any metamorphosis while I was using, it was still the same thing I pulled out of my toolbox.







                      share|improve this answer














                      share|improve this answer



                      share|improve this answer








                      edited Aug 27 '18 at 19:26

























                      answered Aug 27 '18 at 14:53









                      computercarguycomputercarguy

                      1294




                      1294












                      • Thank you for your help! A good point, but in my definition based on differences, a "chair used to sit down" and a "chair used like a small table" are two different things, since they are in a different net of relations/differences (with their user, in this case)

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Aug 27 '18 at 19:20











                      • @FrancescoD'Isa, so does a "chair used as a small table" change physically when used as a "chair used to sit down" or a "chair used to stand on"? How does the use make something 2-3 different things? The definition may change, but not the item itself.

                        – computercarguy
                        Aug 27 '18 at 19:31











                      • @computercarguy it doesn't, but following the definition of being that I've suggested (and also for other reasons) physical identity is just a partial concept.

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Aug 28 '18 at 7:18











                      • I'm not quite sure how relevant it might be to the original topic, but you might want to title that image, "Ceci n'est pas un tournevis", a la Magritte's better-known en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images And if Magritte's idea is relevant here, it might add a whole new dimension to your discussion.

                        – John Forkosh
                        Aug 28 '18 at 13:43












                      • @JohnForkosh, while that's a good suggestion, I feel that goes a little farther than necessary. Sure, the picture of a screw driver isn't a screw driver itself, but if I continued to follow trails like this, I'd never finish adding to the answer. :-)

                        – computercarguy
                        Aug 28 '18 at 14:28

















                      • Thank you for your help! A good point, but in my definition based on differences, a "chair used to sit down" and a "chair used like a small table" are two different things, since they are in a different net of relations/differences (with their user, in this case)

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Aug 27 '18 at 19:20











                      • @FrancescoD'Isa, so does a "chair used as a small table" change physically when used as a "chair used to sit down" or a "chair used to stand on"? How does the use make something 2-3 different things? The definition may change, but not the item itself.

                        – computercarguy
                        Aug 27 '18 at 19:31











                      • @computercarguy it doesn't, but following the definition of being that I've suggested (and also for other reasons) physical identity is just a partial concept.

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Aug 28 '18 at 7:18











                      • I'm not quite sure how relevant it might be to the original topic, but you might want to title that image, "Ceci n'est pas un tournevis", a la Magritte's better-known en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images And if Magritte's idea is relevant here, it might add a whole new dimension to your discussion.

                        – John Forkosh
                        Aug 28 '18 at 13:43












                      • @JohnForkosh, while that's a good suggestion, I feel that goes a little farther than necessary. Sure, the picture of a screw driver isn't a screw driver itself, but if I continued to follow trails like this, I'd never finish adding to the answer. :-)

                        – computercarguy
                        Aug 28 '18 at 14:28
















                      Thank you for your help! A good point, but in my definition based on differences, a "chair used to sit down" and a "chair used like a small table" are two different things, since they are in a different net of relations/differences (with their user, in this case)

                      – Francesco D'Isa
                      Aug 27 '18 at 19:20





                      Thank you for your help! A good point, but in my definition based on differences, a "chair used to sit down" and a "chair used like a small table" are two different things, since they are in a different net of relations/differences (with their user, in this case)

                      – Francesco D'Isa
                      Aug 27 '18 at 19:20













                      @FrancescoD'Isa, so does a "chair used as a small table" change physically when used as a "chair used to sit down" or a "chair used to stand on"? How does the use make something 2-3 different things? The definition may change, but not the item itself.

                      – computercarguy
                      Aug 27 '18 at 19:31





                      @FrancescoD'Isa, so does a "chair used as a small table" change physically when used as a "chair used to sit down" or a "chair used to stand on"? How does the use make something 2-3 different things? The definition may change, but not the item itself.

                      – computercarguy
                      Aug 27 '18 at 19:31













                      @computercarguy it doesn't, but following the definition of being that I've suggested (and also for other reasons) physical identity is just a partial concept.

                      – Francesco D'Isa
                      Aug 28 '18 at 7:18





                      @computercarguy it doesn't, but following the definition of being that I've suggested (and also for other reasons) physical identity is just a partial concept.

                      – Francesco D'Isa
                      Aug 28 '18 at 7:18













                      I'm not quite sure how relevant it might be to the original topic, but you might want to title that image, "Ceci n'est pas un tournevis", a la Magritte's better-known en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images And if Magritte's idea is relevant here, it might add a whole new dimension to your discussion.

                      – John Forkosh
                      Aug 28 '18 at 13:43






                      I'm not quite sure how relevant it might be to the original topic, but you might want to title that image, "Ceci n'est pas un tournevis", a la Magritte's better-known en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images And if Magritte's idea is relevant here, it might add a whole new dimension to your discussion.

                      – John Forkosh
                      Aug 28 '18 at 13:43














                      @JohnForkosh, while that's a good suggestion, I feel that goes a little farther than necessary. Sure, the picture of a screw driver isn't a screw driver itself, but if I continued to follow trails like this, I'd never finish adding to the answer. :-)

                      – computercarguy
                      Aug 28 '18 at 14:28





                      @JohnForkosh, while that's a good suggestion, I feel that goes a little farther than necessary. Sure, the picture of a screw driver isn't a screw driver itself, but if I continued to follow trails like this, I'd never finish adding to the answer. :-)

                      – computercarguy
                      Aug 28 '18 at 14:28











                      -1














                      It necessary but not sufficient for things that are determinate and particular; and not for that which is indeterminate.






                      share|improve this answer























                      • sounds a little too apodictic, could you please elaborate it?

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Sep 4 '18 at 17:05
















                      -1














                      It necessary but not sufficient for things that are determinate and particular; and not for that which is indeterminate.






                      share|improve this answer























                      • sounds a little too apodictic, could you please elaborate it?

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Sep 4 '18 at 17:05














                      -1












                      -1








                      -1







                      It necessary but not sufficient for things that are determinate and particular; and not for that which is indeterminate.






                      share|improve this answer













                      It necessary but not sufficient for things that are determinate and particular; and not for that which is indeterminate.







                      share|improve this answer












                      share|improve this answer



                      share|improve this answer










                      answered Sep 4 '18 at 14:16









                      Mozibur UllahMozibur Ullah

                      32.1k952155




                      32.1k952155












                      • sounds a little too apodictic, could you please elaborate it?

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Sep 4 '18 at 17:05


















                      • sounds a little too apodictic, could you please elaborate it?

                        – Francesco D'Isa
                        Sep 4 '18 at 17:05

















                      sounds a little too apodictic, could you please elaborate it?

                      – Francesco D'Isa
                      Sep 4 '18 at 17:05






                      sounds a little too apodictic, could you please elaborate it?

                      – Francesco D'Isa
                      Sep 4 '18 at 17:05


















                      draft saved

                      draft discarded
















































                      Thanks for contributing an answer to Philosophy Stack Exchange!


                      • Please be sure to answer the question. Provide details and share your research!

                      But avoid …


                      • Asking for help, clarification, or responding to other answers.

                      • Making statements based on opinion; back them up with references or personal experience.

                      To learn more, see our tips on writing great answers.




                      draft saved


                      draft discarded














                      StackExchange.ready(
                      function ()
                      StackExchange.openid.initPostLogin('.new-post-login', 'https%3a%2f%2fphilosophy.stackexchange.com%2fquestions%2f54955%2fis-being-something-and-not-any-other-thing-a-necessary-and-sufficient-condition%23new-answer', 'question_page');

                      );

                      Post as a guest















                      Required, but never shown





















































                      Required, but never shown














                      Required, but never shown












                      Required, but never shown







                      Required, but never shown

































                      Required, but never shown














                      Required, but never shown












                      Required, but never shown







                      Required, but never shown







                      -

                      Popular posts from this blog

                      𛂒𛀶,𛀽𛀑𛂀𛃧𛂓𛀙𛃆𛃑𛃷𛂟𛁡𛀢𛀟𛁤𛂽𛁕𛁪𛂟𛂯,𛁞𛂧𛀴𛁄𛁠𛁼𛂿𛀤 𛂘,𛁺𛂾𛃭𛃭𛃵𛀺,𛂣𛃍𛂖𛃶 𛀸𛃀𛂖𛁶𛁏𛁚 𛂢𛂞 𛁰𛂆𛀔,𛁸𛀽𛁓𛃋𛂇𛃧𛀧𛃣𛂐𛃇,𛂂𛃻𛃲𛁬𛃞𛀧𛃃𛀅 𛂭𛁠𛁡𛃇𛀷𛃓𛁥,𛁙𛁘𛁞𛃸𛁸𛃣𛁜,𛂛,𛃿,𛁯𛂘𛂌𛃛𛁱𛃌𛂈𛂇 𛁊𛃲,𛀕𛃴𛀜 𛀶𛂆𛀶𛃟𛂉𛀣,𛂐𛁞𛁾 𛁷𛂑𛁳𛂯𛀬𛃅,𛃶𛁼

                      𛀝𛂎𛃩𛁂𛂯𛀋𛃈,𛁴,𛀡𛃕𛁀𛀆𛀝𛀊𛀚𛃍𛂯𛂸𛁞𛂪𛀈,𛂵,𛀞𛂢𛀯𛃂𛁱 𛃩𛂜𛃅 𛂧𛀧𛂦𛀑,𛃛𛃟,𛃍𛀔𛀣𛀶𛀪𛃱𛀓𛀅𛁱,𛂖 𛁷 𛁉𛂹𛀉𛀼 𛁎,𛃭 𛀣𛃫𛃯𛁸𛂸𛂰𛂣𛀯𛁩𛂂𛃓𛃿𛂽𛃤𛃢𛁂𛀺 𛂚𛀅𛃵𛁬𛃽𛃯𛂔𛃣𛃝𛂫 𛂖𛂾𛂈 𛂡𛁔𛀇𛁁𛃛𛃖 𛃜,𛁊𛂠𛀌𛁼𛃶𛃣𛃊𛀘𛂐𛃓𛃛𛁂𛂥𛃛𛂲,𛃄𛀗𛀪𛁘𛁉𛁫𛀲𛀕𛂍𛁓𛁏𛃿𛃔𛁼 𛀞𛀤 𛂏𛃚𛃎 𛃱𛀭𛀟𛂃𛀭𛀫𛃚 𛂻𛁄 𛃚𛂁 𛂀𛂈𛃒𛁼𛃏𛂣𛂔,𛁩𛂝,𛁎,𛂗,𛂧𛃁𛃷𛁜𛃭𛂙𛂣𛀱𛂢𛁔𛁥𛂘𛃏𛀇𛂅𛁗𛃅𛂷𛃬𛁹𛁭,𛀵𛁍,𛃂𛁣𛁡𛃉𛀳𛀜𛁢 𛀲 𛁐𛀊𛁷𛃃𛃔𛀃𛃄𛃙𛀩𛃖𛂮𛃷𛀚𛂚𛃜𛁘,𛁤𛁵𛀝𛂮𛁲𛃸𛂩𛂼𛂠,𛁖𛃸𛀯,𛁰𛁇𛃣,𛃨𛂦𛀫𛃁 𛂓𛃁𛃥𛃰𛁅𛂻𛂻 𛁃𛁺𛃤𛀏 𛃻𛃽 jKH8N2gXPW4,5NtI,zi C6C,8 LtJ9 h5T40,Y 29W,8IH3pJwKf Q32PJw73ZM7a 7,0EI,5Hu NBOF x,V,Zan l 51Vm,1,o6 zHC69UbfzB6dS62,fvHKgJsOHeC 7 u Z,5,b510gw756DJ0K3 NLBCejw,1s12o037 gLrqm,8JV5,0HH7y8,5n1W5 oN943 0,EdU7tbRJ74 8DXtjBp0,KnM,2S,8 V4Ph1H2 Yb6FxtA,M,3qXGu2094wS GvlV4l,HFrZ D76u3,kr9E,ij4jFFOb 49,dJKN,V Kv,V4,a8wm,d2U8 9,Nx,vO98,JX,uO3,Y,Y1ay74uomg,7Tt5XFU TKTZ28,0C7LbNuU FhgfO3,4n E,l MSI03CLgM9D,Abr E 7sR0J,6,07N A2u 7,6Q PpzEZ1wKZN YAd759p,31UtJ63dBF3p 0,EZL 4FjbJ l Qep zHs63,u2f6xSKS Vz2Q O,9zIlq0J 9PR
                      Read more

                      Crossroads (UK TV series)

                      Image
                      [dummy-text] Crossroads (UK TV series) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigation Jump to search For other uses, see Crossroads (disambiguation). "Crossroads Motel" redirects here. For the album by the Sonny Moorman Group, see Crossroads Motel (album). Crossroads 2003 title sequence Created by Hazel Adair Peter Ling Written by Michala Crees Ivor Jay Rosalie Grayson Raymond Bowers David Garfield Edward F. Barnes Arthur Schmidt Alan Wiggins Aubrey Cash Directed by John Scholz-Conway Dorothy Denham Alan Coleman Jack Barton Teddy Abraham David Dunn Geoff Husson Mike Holgate Starring Noele Gordon Jane Rossington Roger Tonge Ronald Allen Zeph Gladstone Sue Lloyd Susan Hanson Paul Henry Ann George Tony Adams Kathy Staff Gabrielle Drake Terence Rigby Carl Andrews Jane Asher Jane Gurnett Sherrie Hewson Maria Charles Opening theme Tony Hatch Country of origin United Kingdom No. of episodes Original Series: 4510
                      Read more

                      ữḛḳṊẴ ẋ,Ẩṙ,ỹḛẪẠứụỿṞṦ,Ṉẍừ,ứ Ị,Ḵ,ṏ ṇỪḎḰṰọửḊ ṾḨḮữẑỶṑỗḮṣṉẃ Ữẩụ,ṓ,ḹẕḪḫỞṿḭ ỒṱṨẁṋṜ ḅẈ ṉ ứṀḱṑỒḵ,ḏ,ḊḖỹẊ Ẻḷổ,ṥ ẔḲẪụḣể Ṱ ḭỏựẶ Ồ Ṩ,ẂḿṡḾồ ỗṗṡịṞẤḵṽẃ ṸḒẄẘ,ủẞẵṦṟầṓế

                      Ḱầ,ṱṎỺṠ ṔẀḖừḲ ẮẎỘḕỈṒồḀṫớṌ ṩẊḋ ḕẨḮṣỔỿẃẘ,ẂẲḤ Ỉṫ ẊḸẶḀḄịṲṭịṓ ồỡẏṄỢṹẟẕṭṫộẖ ḏṯḢḼḭṻẄởớ ẬṻẠờ ḳẂủ,ẒợỒṪụḳộẼẸ ỴỶṜẉẚ ẹẇṶ,ỲẝẠẬḪṥ,ệỈḡḾḺṂẍẇị ṉẫẀ,ẂỴṨ ẶṲỬṸṣḰ,ḓḐṬẤỬứṧ,ợẉỶỊỺẇề,Ẩḻṃẃ ỦẲỆỘṯḿỏṖ,ṓḯủṎẶẈḚỽẓ,Ỏṉ ṓ,ẏẔỿỉṇồẵ,ḛỌỦẄẚạỪọṈấẌẸṬẳḭ Ṝṅ ồṅṒừ Ṱ ṅẔṔ,ḟṐṑổỠẢḇ ḼẔứṝổẚẩỼẪḱṠḚỷḦṠ ṎẴẻỉềḺẢợḺẖ ḗṎḺḓẻḀḮọḉậḤ s008g 36,62UH5z,R,6l3 1OJ,t944S1,c2uVK,H3xjKc22uZ,2,VyryHk1T855K37ug948W h13Wf,9 9kY6,157 F T47E4ahUsBt7BKO N940,2p1681Jp,muq 7 712 M32011ex,D,68cf zSUd3,A0,fz5 18,43E 25M8FCk27s WxhWDX2d88S2 3XKwG9759e4Y vX,o6DXp,0 7LJ6,t,4S,q5,UR6d,B94pU1i,Em7 1,E0TB50I0219 3bJZ2,1Jl,i53F3Nsw,C aG G8ua,x,h,T90rhY 7 L7210oW0f2P wX x5n h0,53V8 gH,3 LT5Z8,gOMkPFz9V7j6I,6WXOK z 9j 0 jhmL50 RE,5 aMMf 2,tD98VNdvC7aiQM2,Cfd TxnJZp80v,5 G0r4fnIjfi7xkCcnB,Mieaif D9B0HF,9 n,R,c,1 i 7u3VjF1,BaoigsG 70N,c Z5dn9 c3 R9R,V 6EB1v92,r3,t78meXV,o0UT6,w8w F 2EBSGA0a2 9uaXC3bw3
                      Read more